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Falling poverty rates could indicate gentrification, or they could mean that London
is now a more fair, socially mixed and cohesive city. Alex Fenton looks at what
happened to poor neighbourhoods under New Labour in the 2000s, and argues
that shifting rates in poverty fail to tell the whole story.
There has been much speculation as to whether the coalition’s housing policy,
especially on Housing Benefit, will displace lower-income households from inner
London. At the same time, some worry that income inequality means that rich and
poor households live increasingly segregated from one another into well-off and disadvantaged
neighbourhoods. The Centre for Analysis for Social Exclusion has been looking at what happened
to poor neighbourhoods under New Labour in the 2000s as part of a major research project for the
Trust for London. We find that in London poverty was already becoming more suburban and more
diffuse even as income inequality in the city rose.
Income poverty is not directly measured at neighbourhood level, so we use the rate of receipt of 
means-tested benefits among working-age adults as a proxy. Although these rates are lower than
conventional definitions of income poverty (around 28% of all London households during the 2000s),
it gives a picture of its relative spatial distribution. The first map shows neighbourhood poverty
estimates in 2001 and 2010.
The same broad pattern of higher poverty in the east persisted, but there are now many fewer
neighbourhoods with exceptionally high rates in inner London.The trends can be brought out by
mapping the change for
larger sectors arranged
by distance from the city
centre. Poverty rates fell
fastest in central London,
and, in detail, fell the most
in those neighbourhoods
which were the most
deprived in 2001. At the
same time, poverty rates
rose in much of Outer
London, especially in the
eastern suburbs. By
several measures of
difference or polarisation,
the income-poor became
less segregated; the
poorest neighbourhoods became steadily less extreme relative to the city average.We know that
income inequality, as
measured for example,
by wages, rose in
London. The gap
between the highest
incomes and the rest is
growing the fastest. In
light of this, the
suburbanisation and
diffusion of poverty might
thus seem a surprising
finding. How might it be
explained, and does it
matter anyway?
One part of the story is
the privatisation of
housing welfare during
the 2000s. At the
beginning of the decade,
around 90% of
households in subsidised housing were rented directly from a council or housing association. Over
the 2000s, there was a net loss of around 25,000 social housing units, almost all in Inner London.
The largest part of these losses were due to the Right-to-Buy; several thousand dwellings were also
demolished. These losses, and the additional housing need arising from a growing population and
static poverty rates were met by publicly subsidised renting from private landlords. The number of
Housing Benefit claimants in private rented housing rose from 100,000 in 2002 to 250,000 in 2010.
The numbers rose fastest in Outer London, where market rents are lower.
Thus, there are now fewer low-income households renting in the inner city on council estates, and
more living in private rented housing in a wider range of neighbourhoods. We might read this as the
state-sanctioned break-up of urban working-class communities. Or we could see the introduction of
market-based choice in housing as enabling subsidised poor households to make the same moves
that households with means have long made in London. There are long-established patterns of
outward migration made by families with young children; the privatisation of housing welfare
enabled some poor households to follow a similar path.
We should also look more closely at what accounts for falling poverty rates. Dwelling and population
density increased substantially in inner London over the period, and did so most in the poorest
neighbourhoods.  Importantly, the number of people of poverty there fell only slightly, but the total
number of working-age adults rose greatly – by about 20% in the poorest inner-city areas. Working-
age, employed adults moved into in newly constructed flats, such as those to be seen on watersides
in Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Islington. Changing poverty rates don’t tell the whole story – or at
least, we have to ask whether it was the top half of the fraction (the number in poverty) or the bottom
half (the total resident population) that changed.  Falling poverty rates don’t necessarily imply fewer
people in poverty.
Looking at rates and counts over time doesn’t tell us whether these changes matter or not. Talking
about the material and social differences between places (for example, differences in life
expectancy) within a country or city is often simply a way of pointing out inequality in general in
British society, rather than saying something specific about those places.
Our research will be looking further at some specific questions about poor neighbourhoods as
places both under New Labour and under the coalition. For example, are these trends a good thing
because they mean that fewer people are subject to the most difficult neighbourhood conditions
associated with concentrated poverty, such as crime, inferior services and a dilapidated public
realm?
There are other questions whose answers reflect views of a good city and a good society; they are
matters of value rather than fact. So, for example: are these changes bad because they indicate
gentrification, or do they mean that London is now more fair, socially mixed and cohesive city? It is
worth being suspicious of accounts of ‘cohesion’, ‘deviance’ or ‘integration’ that look only at poor
neighbourhoods as the location of social problems, and hence the proper object of intervention.
Finally, are we merely at a transition point between the London of the 1970s and 1980s, with its
falling population, disinvestment and the departure of the middle class, and a London of the future,
with inner neighbourhoods populated by wealthy consumers and the poor priced out to parts of the
periphery? Given how central housing is to the mayoral debates, our findings prompt important
questions about the kind of city Londoners want to see, and how it can be fashioned.
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. Jenny Jones: “My vision for London is of a more sustainable, fairer and cleaner city”.
2. Ken Livingstone: “Londoners need a city where they can make their home, feel safe and not
be priced out”.
3. Boris Johnson: “I can see what needs to be done to secure London’s future”.
4. London’s choice of mayor will give a tantalising hint of which party will be favourites to win the
next general election
